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Today, businesses generate massive and ever-increasing quantities of data.  
When faced with the prospect of litigation, current rules force businesses to 
assume significant costs to store and maintain data that may relate to that 
litigation.  Recent revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codified a 
modern approach to preserving electronic data in the event a company might 
face litigation in the future.  The drafters proposed amendments, knowing that 
modern rules were not working.  While designed to address this concern, the 
revisions largely left untouched the primary drivers of preservation costs.  The 
revisions leave unclear: 1) when the duty to preserve attaches, 2) what material 
must be preserved, and 3) the culpability standard for imposing sanctions when 
information is lost.  Many commentators believe these deficiencies are the result 
of rules failing to keep pace with the explosion of modern technology.  But the 
opposite may be true.  Ambiguity in the modern construction was not inevitable.  
                                                 
 + Robert Keeling is a Partner at Sidley Austin LLP whose practice focuses on electronic discovery 
issues. He would like to thank Chris Eiswerth, Grady Nye, Nate Wright, and Lizzy MacGill for 
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Under the traditional common-law approach, there were clear answers to these 
questions that would dramatically lessen the burden to businesses if applied to 
the present day.  Rather than continue trying to play catch-up through indirect 
measures, it is time to return to the historical, common-law standard. 
At the time, it was a routine contract dispute.  Today, it would be viewed as 
an anomaly.  In 1947, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered a claim for 
$3,600 for unpaid labor as part of a construction contract.1  At the core of the 
litigation was the question of how the court should handle the destruction of 
certain “job cards” from a machine shop.2  These job cards were used to track a 
worker’s hours.3  A job card was given to the employee who punched it at a time 
clock when he began and completed working.4  The superintendent collected 
these job cards and made up “job sheets” that collectively included the hours 
worked by each employee on a particular job.5  After the information from the 
job cards was added to the job sheets, company practice was to destroy the job 
cards.6  As one superintendent explained, the job cards became old and greasy 
from the hands of the workers and, once the information had been copied into 
permanent records, they served no further purpose.7 
As the plaintiff completed work on the defendant’s projects, the job sheets 
were used to generate invoices.8  Rather than pay the invoices, the defendants 
sent an auditor to verify them.9  The auditor demanded to see “original 
records.”10  The plaintiff refused, claiming he would not change his system of 
record keeping to accommodate the defendants as the work was “practically 
over.”11  Soon thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit, offering the job sheets as 
evidence of labor performed.12  Defense counsel objected, claiming the plaintiff 
destroyed the job cards after the auditor requested to review the original records, 
and subsequently sought to exclude the job cards as a spoliation sanction.13 
The court sided with the plaintiffs, finding the destruction of these job cards, 
which were largely duplicative and inconvenient to maintain, was not done 
“with the intention of giving [the] plaintiff an unfair advantage over the 
defendants.”14  And so it was at the common law.  Intentional destruction of 
                                                 
 1. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Dev., 31 So. 2d 226, 226–27 (La. 1947). 
 2. Id. at 227–28. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 227. 
 5. Id. at 228. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 226–27. 
 13. Id. at 229. 
 14. Id. at 228. 
2018] Sometimes, Old Rules Know Best 69 
material evidence once litigation commenced (or was imminent) might give rise 
to an inference that the evidence was adverse to the interest of the party who 
destroyed it.  The theory was that a party, conscious of a weakness in their claim, 
might be more willing to destroy adverse evidence.15  But, the scope of this 
doctrine was limited.  By and large, litigants had a duty to preserve only those 
pieces of evidence that directly related to litigation, and that duty started only 
upon the filing of the action between the two parties (or once it was clearly 
imminent).16  Then, even if evidence were destroyed, courts would impose 
sanctions as part of their inherent powers only after the opposing party showed 
that the spoliator had intentionally destroyed the documents in an effort to 
frustrate the litigation.17 
The courts’ inherent power to sanction spoliation finds support in English 
common law and the early cases in the United States.18  For centuries, those 
courts balanced the equities, ensuring that both sides in a dispute had access to 
the necessary documents and that neither side bore a disproportionate share of 
the discovery burden. 
Three decades later, neither discovery practices nor the doctrine remains the 
same.  For modern businesses, the explosion of electronically stored information 
(ESI), which has revolutionized commerce, has also imposed significant costs.19  
These costs are far above and beyond those associated with the storage of job 
cards, given that litigation now requires the implementation of information holds 
and the suspension of document-retention policies.20  Storage alone is costly.21  
                                                 
 15. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference 
of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 421 (2010). 
 16. See Nicole D. Wright, Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e): Spoiling the 
Spoliation Doctrine, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793, 797 (2009). 
 17. Id. at 795. 
 18. See, e.g., Warren v. Crew, 22 Iowa 315 (1867); Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 
(K.B. 1721); see also Scott S. Katz & Anne Marie Muscaro, Spoliage of Evidence–Crimes, 
Sanctions, Inferences, and Torts, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 51 (1993). 
 19. Dennis R. Kiker, Defensible Data Deletion: A Practical Approach to Reducing Cost and 
Managing Risk Associated with Expanding Enterprise Data, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 2, 2014, 
at 3, http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i2/article6.pdf (citing Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much 
Information 2003?, http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/) (“The 
worldwide production of original information as of 2002 was roughly . . . equal to all the words 
ever spoken by human beings.”); EMC Digital Universe Report, with Research and Analysis by 
IDC (April 2014), http://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summ 
ary.htm (explaining that every two years since 2002 the digital universe has doubled in size, until 
in 2013, the universe consisted of 4.4 zettabytes (or 4.4 trillion gigabytes), and is estimated to 44 
zettabytes by 2020). 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties must 
preserve “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”  Id. 
 21. See Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigant 
Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE at 80 
(2012), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1208.html (explaining that although the cost 
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When stored documents and data are reviewed in the course of litigation, prices 
skyrocket.  According to one conservative estimate, the total cost of reviewing 
only a 15% sample of the documents on a small ten-custodian matter adds up to 
$476,902—without any input from outside counsel.22  Unfortunately, these facts 
of modern commerce have worsened due to recent developments in legal 
doctrine, which have led to corporate defendants being forced to shoulder an 
unfair portion of the discovery burden.23 
During the last third of the twentieth century, courts—without explanation—
began moving away from the time-tested formulation of the common-law’s 
spoliation doctrine.24  This movement came to a head with the Southern District 
of New York’s decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV).25  In 
that case, an equities trader had lodged a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against UBS in August 2001 and filed a 
federal suit in February 2002, alleging multiple forms of discrimination.26  
UBS’s counsel supposedly ordered all documents related to Zubulake to be 
retained upon the filing of the EEOC charge, but—even after Zubulake’s counsel 
in August 2002 specifically requested that all e-mails and backup tape be 
retained—several backup tapes were destroyed without explanation.27 
In a landmark opinion, Judge Scheindlin considered whether she would give 
an adverse inference instruction to the jury, meaning that she would allow the 
jury to conclude that the destroyed evidence “would have been favorable to 
Zubulake and harmful to UBS.”28  Judge Scheindlin relied upon her inherent 
powers, powers supposedly governed by the common-law spoliation doctrine.  
However, Judge Scheindlin’s approach deviated in two important ways from the 
common-law approach. 
First, the court determined that a duty to preserve attaches not just when a suit 
is filed, but “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation.”29  Thus, on the 
chance that litigation may occur, the parties must impose litigation holds to 
prevent the routine destruction of evidence.  Second, the requirement of bad faith 
was abandoned.  The court was willing to impose spoliation sanctions—
                                                 
of servers may not be substantial, when “associated expenses for network connections, 
maintenance, redundancy, development, security, and backup, are factored in, all resource 
associated with a single terabyte of preserved data were said to cost in excess of $100,000”). 
 22. Comment of Patrick Oot and the Electronic Discovery Institute, USC-Rules-CV-2013-
0002-1680, at 7 (Feb. 15, 2014). 
 23. Wright, supra note 16, at 809. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (adopting 
the same approach). 
 26. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 215. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 219–20. 
 29. Id. at 218. 
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including giving an adverse inference instruction to the jury30—because a party 
was merely negligent in failing to preserve ESI.31 
These two requirements in combination have led to the over-preservation of 
ESI, which comes at a heavy cost, and gives an in terrorem effect to discovery 
for defendants.32  More importantly, even though an adverse inference was not 
given in Zubulake IV, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion has led to an increase in 
plaintiff-friendly discovery rulings that lead further away from the common-law 
conception of a judge’s inherent power to sanction spoliation offenses. 33 
In recent years, this imbalance and unfairness has become clear, and as a 
result, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) was revised in an attempt to limit 
judges’ inherent powers.34  These revisions—which took effect on December 1, 
2015—undid part of Zubulake IV’s standard by limiting extreme spoliation 
sanctions, such as the invocation of an adverse inference, to parties that “act with 
the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use.”35  However, the 
revisions left untouched Judge Scheindlin’s formulation of the duty to preserve 
and her decision on when that duty attaches.36 
Proposed changes to Rule 37(e) were heavily debated during the public 
comment period.37  Ultimately, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
significantly rewrote the text of the rule, but declined to republish it for public 
comment.38  In its accompanying commentary, the Committee recognized the 
problem of “massive and costly over-preservation” of ESI, including where 
litigation is never brought, but declined to “establish detailed preservation 
guidelines.”39  Surveying the current “range of cases,” the Committee found that 
preservation standards were “too broad and too diverse to permit . . . specific 
                                                 
 30. This instruction would inform the jury that “it can infer from the fact that UBS destroyed 
certain evidence that the evidence, if available, would have been favorable to Zubulake and harmful 
to UBS.” Id. at 219. 
 31. Id. at 220. 
 32. See Wright, supra note 16, at 809 (noting that Zubulake IV’s requirements impose 
significant burdens on corporate defendants in practice). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 
422, 439–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (entering severe sanctions—including attorney’s fees and an adverse 
inference—against the defendants for failing to retain all relevant emails); see generally Dan H. 
Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: 
By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010) (reviewing 230 sanctions awards related to e-
discovery in 401 federal court cases). 
 34. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, Summary of Rule 37(e) Comments 27 
(May 2, 2014). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 37. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES. I.B. Rule: 37(e): Failure to Preserve ESI 
35 (May 2, 2014). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 35–36. 
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guidelines.”40  The Committee thus “chose instead to pursue a different approach 
that addresses court actions in response to a failure to preserve information.”41  
One important aspect of that approach was abandoned between the public 
comment and the final version: the requirement that the loss be the result of bad 
faith.42 
Some argue that the revisions do not go far enough and that defendants are 
still placed in an unfair position.43  Others contend that the revisions permit 
defendants—specifically, corporations—to destroy information essential to 
plaintiffs’ cases.44  Both camps, however, fight over whether the new rule is 
workable and whether it is fair; hardly anyone looks to whether the rule fits with 
our legal traditions and whether it represents a stark deviation from the common 
law of discovery.  Many commentators assume that part of the reason that 
discovery is such a nasty and costly process is because our legal doctrines have 
not adapted fast enough to the ESI revolution.45  In actuality, the reverse may be 
true: in the face of the ESI revolution, courts have abandoned the common law 
and adopted the Zubulake IV approach without regard to its effects or its 
relationship to precedent. 
At common law, parties generally had no preservation obligations until they 
had notice that a lawsuit had been filed (or, at most, that a lawsuit was 
imminent).  Once the suit was active, litigants would be required to retain only 
those documents that were likely to play a key role in determining the outcome 
of the case.  For centuries, this framework deterred unfair litigation tactics 
without resulting in widespread over-preservation. 
This article advocates for a return to the common-law standards for preserving 
evidence.  It proceeds in four parts.  First, it sets out the current state of the law, 
which is largely found in the Zubulake IV standard.  Second, it reviews the 
common-law understanding of the spoliation doctrine and demonstrates how far 
the Zubulake IV standard has strayed from the common law.  Third, it tries to 
explain how Zubulake IV lost its way, in part by failing to consider fully the 
common-law precedent.  Finally, it evaluates the recent revisions to Rule 37(e) 
in light of these legal traditions.  It concludes that reverting to the common-law 
approach—requiring preservation only after litigation is filed or is imminent—
                                                 
 40. Id. at 36. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, PUBLIC COMMENT OF THE ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL TO THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES CONCERNING THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (Feb. 14, 2014). 
 44. See, e.g., Zach Hutchinson, License to Kill (Data): The Danger of an Empowered Rule 
37(e), 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 579–80 (2014). 
 45. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, Summary of Rule 37(e) Comments 
(May 2, 2014). 
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would do more to address the problems of over-preservation than the recent 
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I.  ZUBULAKE IV: THE MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPOLIATION 
DOCTRINE 
This section discusses how the law currently governs preservation and 
discovery of ESI as articulated in Zubulake IV, one of the most frequently cited 
cases on the preservation and spoliation of ESI.  Zubulake IV is most commonly 
cited for its articulation of two significant issues: 1) the trigger date of the duty 
to preserve ESI, and 2) the scope of duty to preserve ESI.  Although Zubulake 
IV endorses a minority position on the culpability standard for imposing 
sanctions for spoliation of evidence, the opinion’s high profile merits discussion 
of that issue as well.  Finally, this section demonstrates how this new schema of 
discovery law is at the root of today’s broken system. 
A.  When the Duty To Preserve Attaches 
Zubulake IV stands for the proposition that the duty to preserve ESI arises 
when at least one of two conditions is met: “when the party has notice that the 
evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the 
evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”46  At this point, the party “must 
suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 
‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”47  The 
inherent uncertainty of this standard is reflected by its application to Zubulake 
IV’s own facts.  Judge Scheindlin begins by writing that “the duty to preserve 
evidence arose, at the latest, on August 16, 2001, when [the plaintiff] filed her 
EEOC charge. . . . [b]ut the duty to preserve may have arisen even before the 
EEOC complaint was filed.”48  At least one employee of the defendant admitted 
in a deposition that the possibility of being sued was “in the back of my head” 
in April of the same year.49  But Judge Scheindlin balked at imposing a duty to 
preserve at such a low threshold, writing that contemplation of litigation by one 
or two employees “does not generally impose a firm-wide duty to preserve.”50  
Instead, Judge Scheindlin asserted that “it appears that almost everyone 
associated with [the plaintiff] recognized the possibility that she might sue,” and 
the duty to preserve attached when “the relevant people at UBS anticipated 
litigation.”51  
                                                 
 46. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 47. Id. at 218. 
 48. Id. at 216. 
 49. Id. at 217. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Apart from the practical difficulties of attributing a small group of relevant 
employees’ knowledge or anticipation of litigation to a company, the Zubulake 
IV standard fails to define who the relevant employees are and how many of 
them must anticipate litigation before the duty to preserve attaches to the entire 
company.  The relevant employees in Zubulake IV included at least two of the 
plaintiff’s co-workers, the plaintiff’s supervisor and supervisor’s supervisor, and 
the plaintiff’s former supervisor.52  The court made no effort to explain which, 
or how many, of those employees would have been sufficient to attribute 
anticipation of litigation to the firm.  The uncertainty of this de jure standard, 
combined with the threat of sanctions, creates a harsher de facto standard than 
Judge Scheindlin likely intended.  In practice, if a company anticipates litigation, 
it should consider issuing a litigation hold because the risk of sanctions is too 
costly. 
B.  The Scope of the Duty To Preserve ESI 
Zubulake IV also stands for the proposition that potential litigants “must not 
destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.”53  More 
specifically, the scope of the duty to preserve includes what the potential litigant 
“knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely 
to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery 
request.”54  This includes all information that may support the claims or defenses 
of any party, and all documents prepared for any individuals likely to have 
relevant information.55 
Judge Scheindlin posits that “the broad contours of the duty to preserve are 
relatively clear.”56  However, such clarity can only be practically achieved at 
great expense.  Corporate litigants must either preserve everything prepared by 
or for all individuals likely to have relevant information in their possession, or 
they must prematurely make significant legal expenditures in order to sift out 
the irrelevant information and return it to its place so that it may be deleted in 
accordance with the firm’s document retention policy.  Many firms choose the 
former course of action as the less disruptive and risky choice.  However, under 
the broad scope of the duty imposed by Zubulake IV, the expense of document 
preservation is still a significant problem.  
C.  The Culpability Standard for Imposing Sanctions 
According to Zubulake IV, a spoliation sanction can be imposed upon 
establishing “the following three elements: (1) that the party having control over 
                                                 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 217. 
 54. Id. (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 55. Id. at 217–18. 
 56. Id. at 217. 
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the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that 
the records were destroyed with a ‘culpable state of mind’ and (3) that the 
destroyed evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense.”57  Notably, 
Judge Scheindlin explains that the Second Circuit includes ordinary negligence 
as a culpable state of mind for the purpose of spoliation sanctions.58  While the 
majority of courts still reject this position in its broadest form, the inclusion of 
ordinary negligence as a culpable state of mind for spoliation sanctions has 
gained wider acceptance,59 adding to the cost and administrative burden of 
complying with Zubulake IV’s expansive e-discovery regime. 
D.  The Post-Zubulake IV Era 
Zubulake IV has become one of the most commonly cited cases on questions 
of discovery.  Westlaw Next shows 3,582 total citing references, including 531 
cases, to Zubulake IV.60  However, the numbers alone insufficiently demonstrate 
how Zubulake IV has influenced modern discovery law.  The cases themselves 
paint a more vivid picture of how the Zubulake IV doctrine has warped discovery 
of ESI into the unmanageable problem it has become. 
In another case decided in the Southern District of New York shortly after 
Zubulake IV, the court, despite finding no evidence the defendant acted in bad 
faith, allowed the plaintiff to present arguments for negative inferences when the 
defendant merely failed to suspend its normal document retention policy.61  The 
plaintiff, MasterCard, brought copyright infringement claims against the 
defendant, owners of a website, for use of its “Priceless” trademark, its 
“Priceless” ad campaign, and the MasterCard trademark and logo.62  In 
discovery, MasterCard sought all documents that the defendants received 
concerning their website.63  The defendant’s server routinely eliminated all 
email received from the public after a twenty-one day period, and the defendant 
failed to suspend this policy for a period of about four months after the complaint 
was filed.64  MasterCard argued that the emails would have demonstrated either 
confusion by the public as to whether MasterCard approved of the defendant’s 
                                                 
 57. Id. at 220. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Lauren R. Nichols, Note, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Litigator? The Varying Degrees of 
Culpability Required for an Adverse Inference Sanction Regarding Spoliation of Electronic 
Discovery, 99 KY. L.J. 881, 885–87 (2010). 
 60. As of a search conducted on January 2, 2017. 
 61. MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Moulton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11376. at *14–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 22, 2004).  Although the court in MasterCard does not cite Zubulake IV, Judge Dolinger 
recognizes an equally broad interpretation of the spoliation doctrine.  Id. (citing Kronisch v. United 
States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 62. Id. at *3–4. 
 63. Id. at *5–6. 
 64. Id. at *5–8. 
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use of the trademark, or that the trademark was “diluted and tarnished” by its 
association with the defendant’s website.65 
The defendant testified that he had not suspended his document retention 
policy because he had not understood that he was required to produce the emails 
in question.66  The court did not doubt his sincerity: 
As for culpability, we are not persuaded that defendants acted in bad 
faith, that is, for the express purpose of obstructing the litigation.  They 
appear simply to have persevered in their normal document retention 
practices, in disregard of their discovery obligations.  The absence of 
bad faith, however, does not protect defendants from appropriate 
sanctions . . .67 
The court then explained that MasterCard demonstrated a variety of ways in 
which the emails may have been relevant, and that the showing of relevance was 
“adequate for the purpose of establishing spoliation.”68  As a result, the court 
permitted MasterCard to argue to the trier of fact that the documents’ destruction 
warranted the inference that the public was confused about MasterCard’s 
association with the website, and that MasterCard’s trademarks had been 
tarnished and diluted.69 
The MasterCard opinion is emblematic of the post-Zubulake IV tendency to 
focus on spoliation at the expense of prudence and the efficient disposition of 
cases.  Even accepting that post-complaint destruction of the documents by the 
defendant was negligent, such negligence should not have been determinative.  
The court itself acknowledged doubts regarding the ultimate salience of the 
spoliation issue, noting that, notwithstanding the potential relevance of the 
missing emails, “the potential prejudice to plaintiff as a result of their loss is at 
least open to question.  The missing e-mails presumably reflected some of the 
content of the website, although plaintiff already has a substantial selection of 
such material.”70  The court brushes away its recitation of doubts and ends its 
analysis with the circular reasoning that the relevance is sufficient to show 
spoliation, and that negligent destruction of the emails is sufficient to show 
relevance: 
Plaintiff’s showing on relevance is adequate for the purpose of 
establishing spoliation.  While the record does not strongly suggest 
that MasterCard is likely to have been seriously hampered in the 
presentation of its case by the failure of the defendants to preserve the 
missing e-mails, we nonetheless recognize that the very fact that the 
e-mails are missing leaves us in the realm of speculation as to what 
                                                 
 65. Id. at *8–9. 
 66. Id. at *8. 
 67. Id. at *11. 
 68. Id. at *12–14. 
 69. Id. at *16. 
 70. Id. at *12. 
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they contained and in what manner they might have assisted plaintiff 
in litigating its claims.71 
Just as the MasterCard court erred by causing the court and the parties to 
spend time and money on a largely immaterial instance of spoliation, other 
courts have erred by punishing spoliation so excessively that over-preservation 
has been incentivized.  In United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., eleven 
employees failed to comply with Philip Morris’s document retention policy 
causing some emails to be lost, and as a result, the company lost a motion for 
evidentiary sanctions in a civil suit brought by the federal government.72  The 
court granted the government’s request that the individuals who failed to comply 
with the retention policy and discovery order were prevented from testifying for 
the defense.73  Additionally, the court imposed a monetary sanction on Philip 
Morris of $2,750,000, plus the government’s costs associated with a deposition 
on email destruction issues.74  The court justified the substantial amount of the 
fine by explaining that there was “no way of knowing what, if any, value those 
destroyed emails had to Plaintiff’s case; because of that absence of knowledge, 
it was impossible to fashion a proportional evidentiary sanction that would 
accurately target the discovery violation.”75  The court also argued that the fine 
was necessary for deterrence, so that “the corporate and legal community 
understand that such conduct will not be tolerated”76 and Philip Morris could be 
punished.77 
While deterrence has some generally accepted value, the court in this case 
neglected to consider the fact that some document destruction—even for 
sophisticated litigants and especially for large litigants like Philip Morris—
cannot be deterred, no matter how steep the fine.  Instead, exorbitant fines lead 
to inefficient over-preservation of documents of low importance by companies 
with no need to hide them.  Further, the costs of industry-wide over-preservation 
are beginning to cripple the litigation system. 
The excessive sanctions and myopic focus on spoliation in the post-Zubulake 
IV era of e-discovery have resulted in doctrinal implications that stretch the 
limits of practicality.  For example, in In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Products 
Liability Litigation, the court imposed sanctions on the defendant for deleting 
the emails of employees who no longer worked at the company, in violation of 
a hold issued more than a decade previously for a different set of claims related 
to the same drug.78  In essence, the court punished the defendant for its broad 
                                                 
 71. Id. at *14 (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 72. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 73. Id. at 25. 
 74. Id. at 26. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86101, at *120–21, *225–31 (W.D. La. June 23, 2014). 
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efforts to preserve potential evidence by making the law coextensive with the 
defendant’s broad hold notice, which asked employees to preserve “any and all 
documents and electronic data which discuss, mention or relate to [the drug at 
issue].”79  Like in the MasterCard case, the court allowed all evidence relating 
to the company’s conduct as to documents and electronic data destruction to go 
before the finder of fact.80  Given that such arguments by the plaintiff’s counsel 
on destruction of evidence are likely to prejudice the jury more than the facts 
warrant, In re Actos demonstrates the unfair prejudice any litigant may face 
given the impracticality of preserving one hundred percent of documents that 
may be construed as relevant.  Failing to effectuate a broad hold notice may 
result in sanctions, just as failing to issue a broad hold notice may also result in 
sanctions. 
II.  THE DUTY TO PRESERVE AT COMMON LAW81 
Today, Zubulake IV has resulted in a discovery regime in which one side 
generally bears the burden and risk of the discovery process.  With the adoption 
of new rules, there is an implication that the current state of discovery is outdated 
and over-protective because the federal courts have failed to adapt to the 
technological changes.  In fact, the problem is that the courts have deviated too 
far from the common law, and in doing so, have upset the traditional balance 
and equity in discovery.  This section discusses how the common law, prior to 
the introduction of ESI, dealt with spoliation.  Specifically, it tracks the early 
American formulation of the duty to preserve and the culpability standard for 
spoliation. 
Any discussion of the origin of the duty to preserve begins with the English 
case Armory v. Delamirie.82  There, “a chimney sweeper’s boy found a jewel 
                                                 
 79. Id. at *129. 
 80. Id. at *225–26. 
 81. Historically, discovery was available only for suits in equity; actions at law depended 
upon oral testimony and, thus, it was generally unnecessary.  See John H. Langbein, The 
Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 531 (2012).  If discovery was 
needed in an action at common law, a litigant needed to file a bill of discovery to compel production 
of documents. See, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 691 
(1933). The bill of discovery “enabled [him or her] (1) to obtain sworn responses from an opposing 
litigant; (2) to require nonparty witnesses to answer interrogatories on oath; and (3) to compel the 
production of relevant documents.”  Langbein, supra, at 540.  With the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, law and equity merged, and all suits and actions in federal court 
could invoke equity’s fact-finding tools.  See FED R. CIV. P. 2, 26; Langbein, supra, at 544–53.  
Despite this bifurcated history, for simplicity’s sake, this article refers to pre-1972 conceptions of 
discovery as the “common-law understanding” of the duty to preserve and the doctrine of 
spoliation.  After all, when the Federal Rules “ma[d]e available three main forms of discovery: 
documents (now including electronic records), interrogatories, and depositions,” they did not 
necessarily displace the governing rules and traditions from the chancery courts. Langbein, supra, 
at 545. Rather, they incorporated them, making them part of the “law.”  See id. 
 82. Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1721); see David A. Bell, Margaret M. 
Koesel & Tracey L. Turnbull, Let’s Level the Playing Field: A New Proposal for Analysis of 
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and carried it to the defendant’s shop (who was a goldsmith) to know what it 
was” and its value.83  The goldsmith, a noted ne’er-do-well,84 gave the jewel to 
his apprentice for appraisal.85  Rather than inspect the jewel and quote a price, 
the apprentice removed the stones from their setting and offered the boy a cut-
rate price.86  When the boy refused to sell, the goldsmith—or his apprentice—
returned the setting to the boy without the stones.87 
The boy brought an action in trover to recover the value of the jewel.88  In 
defense, the goldsmith refused to produce—or could no longer produce, having 
sold—the stones.89  The Chief Justice, refusing to oblige this tactic, “directed 
the jury, that unless the defendant did produce the jewel, and shew it not to be 
of the finest water, they should presume the strongest against him, and make the 
value of the best jewels the measure of their damages.”90  And, of course, the 
jury did so.91 
On its face, this case speaks neither of a duty to preserve nor of the doctrine 
of spoliation.  Yet, in its resolution of the affair, it necessarily decided two—if 
not three—of the same questions addressed by Zubulake IV.  For instance, the 
court must have recognized that a duty to preserve physical evidence attaches at 
some point; otherwise, there would have been no order to produce the jewel for 
inspection after the goldsmith denied having possession.  This is particularly so 
when one considers the common law’s favoritism of oral testimony in jury 
trials.92  The court must also have determined that the goldsmith acted with the 
requisite state of mind in order to invoke the adverse inference that the jewel 
was of the “finest water.”93  Given the case report’s discussion of the 
apprentice’s actions in bad faith—without noting that even less was sufficient94 
—it may be fair to assume that the doctrine of spoliation requires as much. 
This section traces the evolution of these concepts—the duty to preserve and 
the doctrine of spoliation—from the days of Armory to the rise of ESI.  It focuses 
upon what the duty to preserve entails and when it attaches, and examines the 
                                                 
Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 772–73 (1997) 
(concluding that the duty to preserve dates from Armory v. Delamirie); Jason A. Pill & Derek E. 
Larsen-Chaney, Litigating Litigation Holds: A Survey of Common Law Preservation Duty Triggers, 
17 J. TECH L. & POL’Y 193, 197–99 (2012) (concluding the same). 
 83. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664. 
 84. Pill & Larsen-Chaney, supra note 82, at 198. 
 85. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 534 (describing the value of orality in early Anglo-
American trials). 
 93. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664. 
 94. See id. 
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mental state necessary to impose spoliation sanctions, particularly the invocation 
of the adverse inference. 
A.  Common Law Understandings of the Duty to Preserve 
In the decades and centuries following the decision of Armory in the King’s 
Court, English and American courts elaborated upon the contours of the duty to 
preserve.  Generally, as explained below, these courts agreed that the duty to 
preserve extended only to information and documents that would be direct 
evidence in litigation—not, as Zubulake IV found, to information and documents 
that could lead to admissible evidence. 
On this point, In re Eno’s Will95—a probate case—is a prime example.  By 
1915, Amos F. Eno was seventy-eight years old, and his only living brother and 
sister had passed away the year before.96  As a result, Mr. Eno directed the law 
firm of Lord, Day & Lord to prepare a new will by which he would leave about 
half of his rather sizable fortune to different members of his family and about 
half of it to various charitable institutions, including the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art, the American Museum of Natural History, and Columbia University.97  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when Mr. Eno passed away, different members of his 
family—unhappy with their unexpectedly reduced inheritance—contended that 
Mr. Eno was “suffering from senile dementia,” as evidenced by his “growing 
penuriousness” in his later years, when he executed this final will.98  
Accordingly, they claimed that he lacked testamentary capacity and that the 
previous will—the one that dispersed Mr. Eno’s estate only to members of the 
family—should govern.99 
Relevant to the discussion here, after Mr. Eno expired, a clerk at Lord, Day & 
Lord was sent to Mr. Eno’s residence to account for his possessions in 
accordance with the 1915 will.100  There, the clerk “ordered a number of old 
letters to be burned.”101  According to the testimony of the clerk and Mr. Eno’s 
housekeeper, who had read the documents, they “were social letters, invitations, 
acknowledgments of gifts, and other unimportant matters of that nature.”102  
Nonetheless, the unsatisfied heirs claimed that these letters contained evidence 
that Mr. Eno had grown senile.103 
The state court rejected this argument and held that any unfavorable 
“presumption does not arise from the mere destruction of documents.”104  
                                                 
 95. 187 N.Y.S. 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921). 
 96. Id. at 760. 
 97. Id. at 760–61. 
 98. Id. at 765–66. 
 99. Id. at 765. 
 100. Id. at 760, 778. 
 101. Id. at 778. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 779. 
 104. Id. 
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Rather, “[i]t must appear that the documents were written evidence relevant to 
the i[s]sues, or at least the documents should by notice be required to be 
produced upon trial.”105  In this case, “[n]o such evidence was given [that the 
documents were relevant], nor was any notice given or other demand made to 
produce any letter or paper, which was refused on the grounds of its 
destruction.”106  The court determined “[f]rom all that . . . appear[ed] [in the 
record]” that “the papers written by others to the testator would have no 
relevancy or materiality on the sole issue submitted to the jury—the 
testamentary capacity of the testator at the time the will was executed.”107 
Notably missing from the court’s lengthy opinion is any discussion of whether 
the destroyed documents could have led to admissible evidence.  The court, 
instead, focused upon whether the letters and acknowledgments were direct 
evidence of Mr. Eno’s supposed mental infirmity.  Because there was no 
evidence that those social letters touched upon the subject matter of the dispute, 
the court held that the clerk had no duty to preserve them.108 
The focus upon a direct link between the documents withheld or destroyed 
and the subject matter in dispute allowed courts—and litigants—to identify the 
relevant pieces of evidence easily.  Because these documents could be easily 
identified, litigants were on notice of which limited set of documents needed to 
be preserved, and the cost of preserving them was necessarily a fraction of the 
cost of today’s preservation. 
Moreover, this narrow doctrine finds expression in other contemporaneous 
cases as well.  For instance, in Estate of Holmes v. Boyle, the Colorado Supreme 
Court framed the spoliation question as whether “[t]he failure or refusal to 
produce a relevant document, or the destruction of it, is evidence from which 
alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to the possessor.”109  One 
niece was alleged to have written her uncle, alerting him to the death of the 
uncle’s sister, which prompted the uncle to rewrite his will and leave everything 
to the writing niece (and another niece).110  When the uncle died, the writing 
niece traveled immediately to Fairplay, Colorado and, apparently, destroyed all 
of the uncle’s correspondence with other parties alleged to have an interest in 
the estate.111  When the uncle’s sister, who was alive and had been left out of an 
inheritance, contested the will, the writing niece “admitted the destruction” of 
letters written to her uncle when “she was cleaning up the house after the 
funeral.”112 
                                                 
 105. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 773, 779. 
 109. Estate of Holmes v. Boyle, 56 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Colo. 1936) (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 1335. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1336–37. 
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In this case, the court found that the “letters to him were of the utmost 
importance as evidence in the will contest,” given that the writing niece’s 
fraudulent statements would have been contained in the now-destroyed letters.113  
Because the uncle’s sister had produced other circumstantial evidence of the 
niece’s fraud, the court permitted the jury “to infer that the letters, if produced, 
would have supported the case of the contester.”114 
While the court gave the adverse inference instruction, it is important to note 
that the court stressed that the letters were material to the case.115  At that time, 
they would likely have been the only evidence of the niece’s deceit. 
These cases and this doctrine stood on a firm foundation.  In Warren v. Crew, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the invocation of an adverse inference in a 
breach-of-contract action where one of the parties destroyed the contract in 
question.116  Similarly, in Hudson v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
framed the rule as, “everything will be presumed against the despoiler.  Where 
a party to a suit has intentionally destroyed material evidence in a case every 
presumption will be indulged against him.”117  Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that: 
[t]he conduct of the party in omitting to produce that evidence in 
elucidation of the subject-matter in dispute, which is within his power, 
and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently 
affords occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises strong 
suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his 
prejudice.118 
It is important to note that there are few—if any—pre-1972 opinions 
suggesting that the duty to preserve evidence includes documents that might 
relate to admissible evidence regarding one party’s claims or defenses.  Rather, 
the cases indicate that discovery disputes and spoliation charges turned on the 
destruction of evidence central to a cause of action.  Just as the missing jewel in 
Armory sparked the invocation of an adverse inference, the early American 
courts likewise appeared concerned with requiring parties to preserve the 
documents central to a dispute. 
B.  Attachment of the Duty 
Having determined the rough outlines of the common-law duty to preserve 
evidence, the question naturally arises: when does the duty attach?  Zubulake 
                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 1336 (“[T]heir letters to him were of the utmost importance as evidence.”). 
 116. Warren v. Crew, 22 Iowa 315, 322–23 (1867). 
 117. Hudson v. Hudson, 122 N.E. 497, 501 (Ill. 1919); cf. Mastin v. Noble, 157 F. 506, 513 
(8th Cir. 1907) ((“There is no showing that any of these letters, checks, or other papers were 
destroyed in anticipation of litigation in which they might serve as evidence.”) (emphasis added)). 
 118. Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U.S. 379, 383 (1896) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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IV’s answer is “at the time that litigation [is] reasonably anticipated.”119  Under 
the common law, however, courts were much slower to impose preservation 
requirements, waiting to require retention only once litigation began (or was 
imminent). 
The case of Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
Southern Railway Co. clearly demonstrates the common-law position.120  In 
1905, Missouri passed the Maximum Freight Acts, which limited the rates that 
railroads could charge for the transportation of certain goods.121  Before these 
rate limits even went into effect, though, the railroads filed suit, seeking an 
injunction.122  The federal district court granted the railroads’ request,123 but the 
Supreme Court ultimately overturned the injunction in 1913.124  During the 
intervening eight years the railroads continued collecting higher rates.125  
Eventually, many shippers—including the Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co.—
applied for reimbursement.126  In proceedings before a special master, it became 
clear that the railroad had given the shippers receipts, which stated the rate 
charged and the amount of cargo, and that the railroad had kept a copy of these 
receipts for a period of time.127  When the shippers went to review the railroad’s 
records, however, they discovered that the waybills covering their shipments had 
been destroyed “in the normal course of clearing their files.”128 
Had the shippers in this case filed suit against the railroad while the receipts 
remained intact, the Eighth Circuit indicated that the railroad would have had a 
duty to preserve those documents.129  But the parties in Berthold-Jennings had 
not been parties to the earlier suit, and the federal courts had not ordered the 
railroad to preserve all receipts during the pendency of the challenge to the 
Missouri Maximum Freight Rate Acts.130  As a result, the Court determined that 
the railroad was under no duty to preserve the records, which had been destroyed 
between 1914 and 1917—even though it was clear that further litigation would 
                                                 
 119. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 120. Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 80 F.2d 32, 34 
(8th Cir. 1935). 
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 126. Id. at 35. 
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 128. John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or 
Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 231, 231 n.18 (1935) (citing unpublished records from the 
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 129. Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co., 80 F.2d at 41 (stating that “[t]he temporary injunctional 
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result from the Supreme Court’s decision in 1913.131  In addition, the Court 
refused to apply spoliation sanctions—even if the duty had arisen—because 
there was no evidence that the railroad had “any intent or desire to destroy 
evidence.”132 
Conversely, courts would sanction a party who destroyed evidence after a suit 
commenced.  The case of Pomeroy v. Benton is illustrative.133  In that case, two 
partners were engaged in the dry goods business, but after Benton bought out 
Pomeroy, Pomeroy discovered that his partner had been using the partnership’s 
funds to purchase whisky and wine to sell on the side.134  This side business was 
profitable, but Pomeroy never saw a dime of the revenue.135 
During the litigation, it came to light that Benton had kept a private accounting 
book, which detailed the precise amount of profits.136  But, when Pomeroy 
sought discovery of the book and the court ordered disclosure, Benton reported 
that he had destroyed the book after Pomeroy filed suit.137 
In response, the court found that the “defendant destroyed that book after suit 
[was] brought, for the deliberate and sole purpose of cutting off investigation 
into the magnitude of his operations in whisky.”138  Because Benton “ha[d] 
endeavored by all these means to baffle inquiry and shut out investigation,” the 
could held that “nothing remain[ed] . . . but to apply to the defendant [sic] the 
stern rule recognized alike in equity and at law embodied in the maxim omnia 
praesumuntur in odium spoliatoris.”139  Thus, the court required the jury to 
“presume that the evidence destroyed would establish the plaintiff’s demand to 
be just.”140 
Certainly, this case is an extreme example of violating the duty to preserve.  
Nonetheless, the court’s focus on the fact that Benton destroyed the whisky 
accounts with the purpose of stopping investigation suggests that regular 
destruction—as in Berthold-Jennings—would not give rise to such an extreme 
sanction.141  In fact, the Supreme Court of Arkansas interpreted Pomeroy in a 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 42. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64 (Mo. 1882). 
 134. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 128, at 240–41 (recounting facts of case unexplained in 
the court’s opinion). 
 135. Pomeroy, 77 Mo. at 80. 
 136. Id. at 85. 
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 138. Id. (emphasis added). 
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 141. See MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: 
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similar fashion.142  In that case, the plaintiff’s allegations “[were] not sufficiently 
definite and specific to carry knowledge to [the defendant] that the books and 
papers then in its possession were the only documents from which an account 
might be stated,” and the court—citing Pomeroy—held that “the evidence falls 
short of showing that [the defendant] or its officers intentionally destroyed the 
papers and records in question for the purpose of preventing them from being 
used as evidence.”143 
As with the general duty to preserve, it is important to understand what the 
cases do not say about these doctrines.  On this point, the common law 
contemplates the duty to preserve attaching only after litigation begins (or is 
imminent between the parties).144  And there is very little—if anything—in the 
historical record to support Zubulake IV’s understanding of the duty as attaching 
when a party reasonably anticipates litigation. 
What makes the common-law view entirely rational is that, for the most part, 
there is a clear starting point that is not open to debate: the filing of the litigation 
between the parties.  This clarity not only puts the parties on notice of a duty to 
preserve, but it also cuts down on discovery disputes over when the duty to 
preserve started.  It answers a serious problem that many companies express 
about the challenges and costs of preserving data, which they see as more 
concerning than responding to discovery requests.145  In addition, the rule was 
not so inflexible as to allow a party to burn all of the relevant evidence the night 
before litigation began.  Rather, as Pomeroy demonstrated,146 courts could look 
into the parties’ intentions in the rare case that a close look was necessary. 
III.  SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION 
However fuzzy the historical treatment of the duty to preserve’s contours may 
be, the case law governing when spoliation sanctions are appropriate, 
                                                 
his own property, including documents and tangible objects, without liability”); see also id. at 6 
(detailing certain circumstances under which litigation is foreseeable). 
 142. Gallup v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 215 S.W. 586 (Ark. 1919). 
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Teachout’s Estate, 85 N.W. 475, 475 (Mich. 1901) (“Miles himself destroyed the instrument—if it 
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 144. See, e.g., Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 80 
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 146. Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64 (Mo. 1882); see also Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
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particularly the invocation of an adverse inference, is relatively clear.  Pre-1972 
courts generally required a showing that the spoliator acted with bad faith or 
intent to obstruct litigation before giving an adverse inference instruction to the 
jury.147  
Here, the place to begin is Pizarro148 in which the Supreme Court addressed 
for the first time whether spoliation automatically gave rise to an adverse 
inference instruction.  In this prize case, an American privateer sailing from 
Liverpool captured the Spanish ship Pizarro.149  After capture—and during the 
voyage to Savannah, Georgia—a package containing certain papers related to 
the ship’s cargo “was thrown overboard by the advice and assent of the master 
and supercargo.”150  When prize proceedings were instituted, two merchants 
from Amelia Island in present-day Florida contended that the Pizarro and the 
cargo were their property and that, under a 1795 treaty with Spain, they were 
entitled to restitution.151 
The privateers argued for an adverse inference, claiming that the destruction 
of the papers by the claimants’ agents precluded the merchants from introducing 
evidence in support of restitution.152  Writing for the Court, Justice Story stated: 
Concealment, or even spoliation of papers, is not of itself a sufficient 
ground for condemnation in a prize court.  It is, undoubtedly, a very 
awakening circumstance, calculated to excite the vigilance, and justify 
the suspicions of the court.  But it is a circumstance open to 
explanation, for it may have arisen from accident, necessity, or 
superior force; and if the party in the first instance fairly and frankly 
explains it to the satisfaction of the court, it deprives him of no right 
to which he is otherwise entitled.  If, on the other hand, the spoliation 
be unexplained, or the explanation appear weak and futile; if the cause 
                                                 
 147. See, e.g., Bingham v. Keylor, 64 P. 942, 948 (Wash. 1901) (“The fraud was premeditated, 
the spoliation willfully made to conceal it, and we would not disturb a verdict or report which did 
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labour under heavy suspicions, or there be a vehement presumption of 
bad faith, or gross prevarication, it is made the ground of a denial of 
farther proof, and condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence 
which the party is not permitted to supply.153 
Even though the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision not to use the 
inference to bar further testimony, two key points came from this passage: 1) the 
fact that relevant papers were destroyed is not, in and of itself, enough to justify 
invoking an adverse inference; and 2) the proper standard for doing so is “bad 
faith or gross prevarication.”154 
These well-established155 points make the spoliation doctrine coherent.  
Judges give an adverse inference instruction, permitting the jury to assume that 
the destroyed information would harm the destroyer’s case, on two related bases: 
1) there is the logical thought that a person would not violate the duty to preserve 
unless it was to destroy damning evidence; and 2) a person should be punished 
for violating court-imposed duties.156  For either of these reasons to hold water, 
there must be an intent requirement.  Consider the first basis—if a person 
carelessly destroys evidence, there is no guarantee that the evidence was 
damning.  A negligent person may very well destroy the best evidence for his 
case.  The point is that one does not know, and thus, the adverse inference loses 
its tie to logic.  Likewise, the second basis requires a finding of intent.  Some 
might argue that heavy sanctions will force litigants to be more careful in 
preserving documents and that this heightened care will improve the operation 
of the courts.  But at what cost?  An adverse inference essentially ends the case; 
thus, punishing a negligent litigant.157  This runs the risk of elevating respect of 
court-imposed duties over the adjudicatory function of the courts, particularly 
when it is not clear that the documents would have helped the opposing party.  
Therefore, in a common-law system, heavily influenced by equitable principles, 
it is logical that these cases would impose an intent requirement before a court 
used its inherent powers to sanction. 
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Zubulake IV and its progeny’s willingness to consider and impose an adverse 
inference upon a finding of negligence is a drastic departure from this standard.  
The gap is made more apparent by the fact that a variety of courts at common 
law explicitly refused to give an adverse inference instruction upon a mere 
showing of negligence.  In Knapp v. Edwards, a case involving an incapable 
bookkeeper, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to apply the maxim omnia 
praesumuntur contra spoliatorem, stating, “[w]e think this is not a proper case 
for the application of so severe a rule.  The rule in all its rigor is for 
wrongdoers—for those who have been guilty of fraud or willful disregard of 
duty, rather than those who have failed in capacity to perform their 
undertakings.”158  Likewise, in In re Horigan Supply Co., the Eighth Circuit 
refused to grant an adverse inference instruction when a bankruptcy trustee sold 
certain papers to a junk dealer.159  The plaintiff had argued that this sale “was 
extremely negligent” and that “this circumstance should be strongly construed 
against [the trustee].”160  The court held that “the loss was purely accidental and 
entirely without the knowledge” and that “[u]nder such circumstances, there is 
no presumption allowable concerning the contents of the books.”161  To apply 
sanctions, the plaintiff needed to show that the destruction happened “under 
circumstances revealing a purpose to prevent the use of such as evidence.”162 
Despite this consistent run of cases demanding a showing of bad faith or 
willfulness, one decision potentially supports the Zubulake IV standard: 
Escallier v. Baines.163  The case involved the dissolution of a partnership in 
which one partner, Escallier, contributed $5,000 in capital and the other partner, 
Baines, ran the business with exclusive possession and control of the accounting 
books.164  A month after the partnership began, Escallier asked for an accounting 
and dissolution of the partnership.165  Shortly thereafter, he discovered that 
Baines had utterly failed to keep the books, but instead produced a statement 
that only approximately $4,000 was left of Escallier’s capital.166  Given the 
complete failure to account for money spent and taken in, the lower court found 
that Baines had committed constructive fraud and awarded Escallier all of the 
funds held in receivership.167 
The lower court’s rulings were based on the maxim “[o]mnia praesumuntur 
contra spoliatorem,”168 and Baines objected, arguing that “the maxim should be 
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applied only in cases of wrongdoers who have actually destroyed or suppressed 
evidence of their wrongdoing.”169  The Supreme Court of Washington disagreed 
and affirmed the lower court.170  Importantly, the court narrowly read Knapp to 
apply only “where the failure to perform a duty is due solely to incapacity.”171  
It relied instead on Bingham v. Keylor for the proposition that the spoliation 
inference applies whenever “no books of account at all are kept, or if they are so 
kept as to be unintelligible, or if they are destroyed or wrongfully withheld.”172 
If this case was correct, there would at least be some historical support for 
imposing an adverse inference on a finding of mere negligence, but Bingham—
the case cited by Knapp—does not go so far as the latter opinion asserted.173  In 
Bingham, the bookkeeping partner had actually kept some system of records, but 
these memoranda “were found, torn in pieces, in the waste basket of the 
defendant, by the attorney for the plaintiff, the night before [the] action was 
commenced.”174  The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case law on 
spoliation, including Askew and Armory, and concluded that where “[t]he fraud 
was premeditated, the spoliation willfully made to conceal it,” an adverse 
inference is appropriate.175  Thus, Bingham actually contradicts Knapp’s 
holding—and significantly undercuts its historical importance, given that it is 
premised on a misreading of a four-year-old controlling precedent. 
Though the historical record lacks long explanations of the intricacies of the 
duty to preserve and the doctrine of spoliation, it is possible to glean three 
significant points from the cases available.  One, the common-law duty to 
preserve generally required only that parties not destroy evidence directly related 
to litigation.  Two, this duty attached only upon the filing of a suit (or, possibly, 
when the filing of the suit between the actual litigants was imminent).  And three, 
even if documentary evidence was destroyed after the duty attached, an adverse 
inference instruction was appropriate only if there was a showing of bad faith or 
willfulness on the part of the despoiler. 
IV.  ZUBULAKE IV’S FOUNDATION OF SAND 
How did Zubulake IV end up so far from the common law?  The common law 
is designed to be flexible enough to apply to new facts without losing its 
fundamental character.  In other words, the common law should bend, but never 
break.  However, the modern law of e-discovery under Zubulake IV has broken 
in more ways than one: discovery costs have grown to levels grossly 
disproportionate to the value of litigants’ claims; the scope of the duty to 
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preserve ESI dwarfs the scope of admissible documents, or even the range of 
useful documents; and finally, the modern cases on discovery do not rest on a 
sound interpretation of the common law.  Despite the fact that Zubulake IV is 
one of the most frequently cited cases on the preservation and spoliation of ESI, 
a closer look at its claims to precedential authority demonstrate that it has little—
if any—basis in the common law.  Instead, Zubulake IV sets forth a new 
discovery regime that breaks from the common sense and accumulated wisdom 
of courts before it. 
A.  Venturing into Unchartered Territory: Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc. 
In order to understand how Zubulake IV strayed so far from the common law, 
it is helpful to look more closely at the point where courts began to take a wrong 
turn.  One of the earliest electronic discovery cases to be disposed of in court 
provides an illuminating example.  In a 1972 discriminatory employment 
practices case, Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., the plaintiff requested the 
production of the defendant’s computerized master payroll file and computer 
print-outs of W-2 forms as far back as the employer had retained them.176  When 
the defendant failed to produce the documents, the plaintiff filed a motion to 
compel.177  The plaintiff argued that the information sought was “vital and 
relevant” to proving his allegation of discriminatory employment practices; the 
defendant, on the other hand, argued that the request was “too broad, [and] that 
much of the information sought [was] repetitive and irrelevant.”178 
Both sides had reasonable arguments to support their positions.  The plaintiff 
argued that the information was needed “to prepare accurate, up-to-date statistics 
which will be relevant in determining whether or not discriminatory practices 
[had] occurred.”179  Computerized data is comprehensive and reliable, and 
statistical analysis is significantly easier and less expensive to conduct with 
electronic data.180  The defendant countered that the plaintiff had already been 
given the information they requested on computer printouts, so producing the 
computer master file was repetitive.181  The defendant also argued that the rules 
of discovery did not require the production of documents in any specific form.182  
Lurking behind the arguments of both sides was also the issue of cost: who 
should be required to bear the cost of producing and making use of the 
information that the plaintiff was seeking? 
Responding to each side’s arguments, the district court judge observed that 
the notes of the Advisory Committee for Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure demonstrated that the rule contemplated the need for electronic 
discovery.183  However, this need was limited: the notes only addressed the 
occasional need for defendants to produce otherwise inaccessible computerized 
information in a usable form, and they also explained that courts have ample 
power to “protect respondent against undue burden or expense, either by 
restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party pay costs.”184 
Recognizing the limited scope of electronic discovery contemplated by the 
Committee, the court nonetheless concluded that the rule “does not appear to 
preclude the production of computer input information such as computer cards 
or tapes.  Likewise, the court is aware of no reason why documents of this nature 
should not be subject to discovery.”185  The court displayed a similar permissive 
attitude toward the issue of cost: “[b]ecause of the accuracy and inexpensiveness 
of producing the requested documents in the case at bar, this court sees no reason 
why the defendant should not be required to produce the computer cards or tapes 
and the W-2 printouts to the plaintiffs.”186  Oddly, and despite the court’s 
assertion that the requested discovery was inexpensive, the court ordered the 
plaintiff to bear the cost of producing the information187—perhaps an 
unconscious apologetic gesture for expanding the scope of electronic discovery 
in a way that would saddle future defendants with burdens that the court could 
not yet foresee. 
The Adams court should not be blamed for the current state of e-discovery 
law; after all, the court’s decision was not unreasonable based on the facts before 
it and the technological landscape that existed in 1972.  But the permissive 
approach of Adams is emblematic of the shift away from the traditional 
common-law approach and toward the burgeoning e-discovery regime enshrined 
in Zubulake IV.  Courts began to focus on the technology instead of precedent, 
and in time the doctrine’s connection with precedent weakened substantially.188  
The subsections that follow will demonstrate how Zubulake IV’s claims of 
precedential support for each prong of its spoliation doctrine evaporate upon 
closer examination. 
B.  Triggering the Duty to Preserve 
In addition to its practical shortcomings, the Zubulake IV standard for 
triggering the duty to preserve is not based in a sound interpretation of the 
common law.189  In support of its proposition that the duty to preserve arises 
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when a party reasonably anticipates litigation, Zubulake IV cites three cases,190 
two of which rely on the third, Kronisch v. United States.191  And upon closer 
examination, Kronisch does not bear the weight of the proposition Zubulake IV 
placed upon it. 
In Kronisch, only five years prior to Zubulake IV, the Second Circuit framed 
the trigger of the duty to preserve with a different emphasis.192  Kronisch 
observed that the: 
obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that 
the evidence is relevant to litigation— most commonly when suit has 
already been filed, providing the party responsible for the destruction 
with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as 
for example when a party should have known that the evidence may 
be relevant to future litigation.193 
Although the difference between Zubulake IV’s statement of the rule and the 
one found in Kronisch appears to turn only on the question of frequency, the 
court in Kronisch may have qualified its statement for two reasons: 1) the case 
law does not support a wholesale expansion of the rule, and 2) the court was 
considering a motion for summary judgment and, therefore, presumed “that 
defendants had an obligation to preserve the files.”194 
Kronisch cites two cases for the idea that the duty to preserve may 
occasionally arise when a party should have known that the evidence would be 
relevant to future litigation.195  These cases cite others, some of which cite one 
another and some of which give differing variations of the rule.196  While it 
would be tedious in this space to trace each of the wandering trails of precedent 
to the point where it goes cold, a short example may demonstrate how far 
Zubulake IV has strayed from the traditional common-law approach. 
One commonly cited case is Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Texas Instruments, 
Inc., decided in 1977.197  In Bowmar, the court refused to sanction the defendant 
for destroying documents at the direction of its legal department prior to 
litigation, because “it is quite impossible to find that the defendant’s actions 
constituted the willful destruction of evidence” without a showing that “those 
responsible for the document destruction were aware at the time it took place 
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that this litigation was a serious threat.”198  Although the plaintiff furnished 
deposition testimony of two employees who had heard rumors that the plaintiff 
intended to sue, the court determined that “a rumor circulated in the offices of a 
large corporation . . . is too slim a reed to support the plaintiff’s charges.”199  The 
court also faulted the plaintiff for failing to make an attempt to show when the 
threat of litigation became known to the legal department, which was responsible 
for document destruction.200  Different from the Zubulake IV standard, which 
would impose sanctions on a litigant when it reasonably should have anticipated 
the possibility of litigation, Bowmar refused to impose sanctions because the 
plaintiff could not make “a clear showing of this knowledge” of “the threat of 
litigation.”201 
Courts seeking to support the Zubulake IV standard for the duty to preserve 
often cite the following statement from Bowmar, which articulated a need for 
“some duty” to be imposed prior to litigation: 
It has long been recognized that sanctions may be proper where a 
party, before a lawsuit is instituted, willfully places himself in such a 
position that he is unable to comply with a subsequent discovery order. 
Although a potential litigant is under no obligation to preserve every 
document in its possession, whatever its degree of relevance, prior to 
the commencement of a lawsuit, some duty must be imposed in 
circumstances such as these lest the fact-finding process in our courts 
be reduced to a mockery.202 
The context of this statement gives it greater meaning.  The plaintiff in 
Bowmar alleged that the defendant had engaged in the wholesale destruction of 
documents relevant to the case.  In response, the defendant argued “the court is 
powerless to punish the wholesale, willful destruction of relevant evidence 
where the destruction takes place prior to a specific court order for their 
production.”203  Although the court rejected the defendant’s argument,204 the 
boldness of the defendant’s legal position reveals that the law at the time 
reflected a much more limited duty to preserve than the broad standard created 
by Zubulake IV.  Rather than showing support for the Zubulake IV rule, Bowmar 
is an example of restraint for refusing to sanction a defendant who was accused 
of intentionally destroying relevant evidence wholesale. 
This interpretation of Bowmar as an example of judicial restraint is further 
supported by its citations to United States v. International Business Machines 
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Corp (IBM)205 and Societe Internationale v. Rogers,206 neither of which endorses 
the broad duty to preserve articulated by Zubulake IV.  In IBM, the government 
instituted an antitrust action against IBM, and IBM later claimed that the 
government destroyed documents prior to the entry of a pretrial order.207  While 
the court held that the government, who initiated the litigation, did have an 
“obligation to preserve all documents specifically requested that were relevant 
to this litigation,” there is no statement from the court indicating that such a duty 
also exists for the defendants who should have reasonably anticipated 
litigation.208 
Under the traditional common-law approach, the duty to preserve ought to be 
triggered at the filing of the complaint, or on occasion, when the plaintiff can 
convincingly demonstrate that the defendant knew that an action would be 
filed.209  This standard would preserve a better balance between litigants, prevent 
flagrant abuse of discovery rules, and maximize the efficient disposition of 
claims by minimizing litigation costs. 
C.  Scope of the Duty to Preserve 
Just as it does in other areas, Zubulake IV strays from the traditional common-
law scope of the duty to preserve just far enough to cause an imbalance between 
discovery obligations and the ultimate aims of the litigation process.  Zubulake 
IV itself contains a kernel of the old doctrine; in describing the scope of the duty 
to preserve, Judge Scheindlin explained that the duty to preserve only extends 
to “those employees likely to have relevant information—the ‘key players’ in 
the case.”210  This “key players” standard for custodians is a conspicuously 
uneven match with the broad standard for evidence, which includes all relevant 
evidence, or even evidence reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.  The expansion of the standard for preservation of evidence 
to include the whole universe of discoverable information is ultimately a major 
source of the problems that currently complicates the process of e-discovery.  
Just like the standard for custodians, the standard for preservation of evidence 
ought to apply only to “key” evidence—evidence that is likely to be essential to 
a particular party’s claims in the case. 
The key evidence standard, in practice, is what the courts have most frequently 
applied—regardless of how they state the law.  For example, Zubulake IV quotes 
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Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., Inc. for its broad statement 
of the law; but when the Wm. T. Thompson court applied law, the court held that 
“GNC is subject to sanctions . . . for knowingly and purposefully permitting its 
employees to destroy key documents and records.”211 
The Wm. T. Thompson case is also cited by Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, 
Inc. for the same broad statement of the law used in Zubulake IV.212  However, 
in application, the evidence at issue in Turner fits the key evidence standard.213  
In a personal injury action where the complaint charged “the bus lacked good 
and sufficient brakes,” the court held that “at least by the time the complaint was 
served, Hudson Transit was on notice that maintenance records should be 
preserved.”214  In this case, the maintenance records for the bus are a good 
example of key evidence.  A court applying the key evidence standard would 
have been reasonable to conclude that maintenance records for the bus involved 
in the accident are likely to be essential to the plaintiff’s claim. 
Another case demonstrates the same pattern of applying a key evidence 
standard despite a broad statement of the law.  In Computer Associations 
International, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc., the court cites Wm. T. 
Thompson’s standard but goes on to conclude that the defendant was subject to 
sanctions for destroying source code despite its knowledge of the “crucial 
importance of the source code as evidence.”215  Consistent with other cases that 
have been examined here, the court imposed the duty to preserve old versions 
shortly after the complaint was filed.216  The court resorted to sanctions after 
concluding that the defendant: 
intentionally destroyed portions of the source code not only after being 
served in this action and thus put on notice that the source code was 
irreplaceable evidence, but even after the request for production and 
motion to compel had dramatically and specifically emphasized the 
significance of the code versions being destroyed as evidence.217 
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The fact that the evidence was key to the plaintiff’s case was the motivating 
factor behind imposing the sanctions.218 
As these cases illustrate, the broad statement of law endorsed by Zubulake IV 
does not accurately reflect the scope of the duty to preserve.  On the contrary, 
Zubulake IV abandons common-law applications of the rule in favor of a new 
regime that encourages over-preservation of documents and increased litigation 
expenses.219  By returning to a status quo that matches the traditional common-
law interpretation of the scope of the duty to preserve evidence, courts and 
litigants will be more capable of keeping e-discovery in its rightful place as an 
appendage to dispute resolution, and not the bully of dispute resolution.220 
D.  The Culpability Standard 
The willingness of the Second Circuit and Zubulake IV to impose sanctions 
for negligent destruction of evidence is also at odds with the common law, which 
generally imposed spoliation sanctions—and particularly adverse inference 
instructions—only for bad faith.221  Demonstrating the confusion that has 
resulted from abandoning the common-law position, courts split on whether an 
adverse inference was warranted in the absence of bath faith.222  While about 
half of the circuits maintained the common-law standard of bad faith for 
imposing adverse inferences, the ordinary negligence position of Zubulake IV 
garnered some qualified support in the other circuits, some of which have mixed 
the standards into varying balancing tests.  In the Fifth,223 Seventh,224 Tenth,225 
and Eleventh226 Circuits, an adverse instruction required a showing of bad 
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faith.227  Similarly, although the Eighth Circuit did not specifically use the words 
“bad faith,” it did require a finding of “intentional destruction of evidence 
indicating a desire to suppress the truth” before an adverse instruction is 
justified.228  This requirement was similar in its effect to the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition of bad faith, which it defined as “destruction for the purpose of hiding 
adverse information.”229 
The Third and Fourth Circuits did not require a showing of bad faith, but they 
typically did require that the destruction of evidence be willful or deliberate, as 
opposed to merely negligent.230  The First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits employ a 
balancing approach that considered bad faith and prejudice to the non-spoliator 
in determining the appropriate sanction.231  It appears that only the Second 
Circuit explicitly endorsed the use of adverse inference instructions for 
                                                 
 227. The Sixth Circuit has stopped short of adopting this approach in the past, but appears to 
be more open to it after the 2015 Amendments to Rule 37. Compare Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 
650, 652–53 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that district courts have broad discretion to impose spoliation 
sanctions, including for negligence) with Applebaum v. Target Corp., 831 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir. 
2016) (holding that after the 2015 Amendment to Rule 37, “[a] showing of negligence or even gross 
negligence will not” justify “an adverse inference instruction for spoliation of electronic 
information.”). 
 228. Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 559 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
 229. Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 230. See Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining that “it 
must appear that there has been an actual suppression or withholding of the evidence; no 
unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the document or article in 
question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise 
properly accounted for”); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450–51 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]n adverse inference . . . ‘cannot be drawn [against a party] merely from his negligent loss or 
destruction of evidence; the inference requires a showing that the party knew the evidence was 
relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted in its loss or destruction.’” 
(quoting Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 155–57 (4th Cir. 1995))); see also 
Montgomery v. Iron Rooster-Annapolis, LLC, No. RDB-16-3760, 2017 WL 1902699, at *2 (D. 
Md. May 9, 2017) (finding no “intent to deprive” but leaving the door open for instructing the jury 
to draw an adverse inference). 
 231. See United States v. Lovellette, 472 Fed. Appx. 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2012) (to receive an 
adverse inference instruction, the party must demonstrate that “the evidence was lost in bad faith 
or that [the party] was prejudiced by the loss” (citing United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1259 
(9th Cir. 1997))); Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(“Certainly bad faith is a proper and important consideration in deciding whether and how to 
sanction conduct resulting in the destruction of evidence.  But bad faith is not essential.  If such 
evidence is mishandled through carelessness, and the other side is prejudiced, we think that the 
district court is entitled to consider imposing sanctions, including exclusion of the evidence.”); 
Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The choice of sanction should 
be guided by the ‘concept of proportionality’ between offense and sanction…. In determining 
whether a severe sanction is justified, the district court may consider the resulting prejudice to the 
other party, any prejudice to the judicial system, and the need to deter similar misconduct in the 
future.”). 
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negligence alone.232  This abandonment of the traditional common-law standard 
of bad faith not only caused unpredictability and confusion, it may have also 
been at odds with statements of the U.S. Supreme Court cautioning limited use 
of the courts’ inherent power.233  Courts that impose sanctions for spoliation do 
it in one of two ways: 1) pursuant to Rule 37,234 which grants courts authority to 
sanction litigants who fail to comply with a discovery order; or 2) pursuant to 
the court’s inherent power to protect against litigation abuses.235  By definition, 
any spoliation that occurs prior to the commencement of litigation or entry of a 
discovery order can only be sanctioned through the court’s inherent power.236  
However, the inherent power is a limited one—and the Second Circuit’s 
adoption of the negligence standard for spoliation sanctions may have stretched 
that power too far. 
The inherent powers of federal courts “are necessary to the exercise of all 
others.”237  However, because they are shielded from democratic controls, the 
courts’ inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”238  In 
the context of awarding attorney’s fees, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated 
that sanctions under a court’s inherent authority should be limited to bad faith or 
willful abuses of the judicial process.239  Remanding a case in which the district 
court awarded attorney’s fees to the opposing party, the Supreme Court 
explained that “the trial court did not make a specific finding as to whether 
counsel’s conduct in this case constituted or was tantamount to bad faith, a 
finding that would have to precede any sanction under the court’s inherent 
powers.”240  The Fifth Circuit applied the same limitation specifically to use of 
the court’s inherent power to impose spoliation sanctions, noting that the circuit 
has “confined sanctions under the district court’s inherent power to instances of 
                                                 
 232. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2002). The 
2015 Amendment to Rule 37(e) should supersede Residential Funding’s holding. The Second 
Circuit has since followed the amended rule but has yet to explicitly acknowledge the change. See, 
e.g., Mazzei v. Money Store, 656 Fed. Appx. 558 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that under “the current 
Rule 37(e)(2) . . . an adverse inference instruction may be given for failure to preserve 
electronically stored information ‘only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive 
another party of the information’s use in the litigation.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B))). 
 233. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake IV) 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Chief Justice Roberts’ 2015 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary 8 (Dec. 31, 2015) (specifying that under the amended Rule 
37(e), “adverse jury instruction[s]” might be appropriate only “if the loss of ESI is the result of one 
party’s intent to deprive the other of the information’s use in litigation”). 
 234. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
 235. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 56–58. 
 236. See id. at 42, 44. 
 237. See Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
 238. Id. at 764–65. 
 239. See id. at 764–66 (considering a district court’s award of attorney’s fees). 
 240. Id. at 767. 
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bad faith or willful abuse of the judicial process.”241  While the Second Circuit 
recognized the principle in general and has applied the Supreme Court’s bad 
faith requirement to use the inherent power to sanction attorney conduct,242 it 
made no effort to explain why its inherent power to impose spoliation sanctions 
should not have also been constrained. 
Ultimately, widespread confusion about the culpability standard for imposing 
spoliation sanctions and dissatisfaction with the current e-discovery regime led 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to consider many of these issues in the 
context of revising Rule 37(e).243  The new text attempts to find common ground 
between a standard requiring bad faith and one based solely on negligence.244  
By failing to draw a clear line, it is uncertain whether the new Rule 37(e) will 
have its intended effect of limiting “massive and costly over-preservation” and 
establishing “greater uniformity” in the standards for preserving ESI.245 
V.  SPOLIATION UNDER THE REVISED RULE 37(E) 
On December 1, 2015, a revised Rule 37(e) took effect.246  It is the product of 
several years of discussion regarding the inefficiencies of the judicial system and 
the financial pressures facing businesses because of the preservation of ESI.247  
Compared to the slow pace that usually characterizes legal innovations, the 
speed with which the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules moved to address the 
explosion of ESI over the past fifteen years demonstrated an urgent need for 
reform.  At the same time, the Discovery Subcommittee admitted that its 
proposed changes to Rule 37(e) do not adequately address the full scope of the 
problem: 
                                                 
 241. Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “in the context 
of the federal court’s inherent power, ‘bad faith’ is judged by ‘necessarily stringent’ standards”).  
Although the court in Pressey held that striking the city’s pleadings was an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court, it did note that the court could consider less severe sanctions due to the fact that the 
city “unquestionably behaved improperly.”  Id. at 1023–24. 
 242. United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 243. Scott M. O’Brien, Analog Solutions: E-Discovery Spoliation Sanctions and The Proposed 
Amendments To FRCP 37(E), 65 DUKE L.J. 151, 169 (2015) (stating that “confusion over sanctions 
standards was among the most pressing issues facing the Advisory Committee”). 
 244. See Neil E. Aresty, The 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), ABA 
SECTION OF LITIGATION (Nov. 3, 2015), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/ 
commercial/articles/fall2015-1115-2015-amendment-federal-rule-civil-procedure-37e.html 
(stating that a Judge Rosenthal decision distinguished negligence from bad faith). 
 245. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES. I.B. Rule: 37(e): Failure to Preserve ESI 35 
(May 2, 2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
 246. Michael J. Miles, Discovery Sanctions under Amended Rule 37(e): A Safe(r) Harbor, 
ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (Aug. 30, 2016), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/commit 
tees/pretrial/articles/summer2016-0816-discovery-sanctions-under-amended-rule-37e-safer-harbo 
r.html. 
 247. Daniel M. Braude, Will Changes to Federal Rules Reduce Scope of Discovery?, LAW360 
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/736030. 
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An accumulation of information from many sources, including 
detailed examples provided in the public comments and testimony, 
persuasively supports the proposition that great costs are often 
incurred to preserve information in anticipation of litigation, including 
litigation that never is brought. Given the many other influences that 
bear on the preservation of ESI, however, it is not clear that a rule 
revision can provide complete relief on this front.248 
In an effort to unify the legal landscape around one spoliation sanction 
standard, the new Rule 37(e) permits courts to take only proportional, remedial 
action in response to spoliation that causes prejudice to another party.249  
Specifically, the rule is only triggered when “electronically stored information 
that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost 
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be 
restored or replaced through additional discovery.”250  Thus, not all losses of ESI 
will implicate the rule, which calls for “reasonable steps, not perfection.”251  
Where ESI was lost because “reasonable steps were not taken . . . the next focus 
should be on whether the lost information can be restored or replaced through 
additional discovery.”252  If the ESI can be restored or replaced, sanctions are 
not warranted. 
Where these threshold findings for applicability are crossed, Rule 37(e) allows 
for more severe sanctions only “upon finding that a party acted with the intent 
to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.”253  In 
articulating this standard, the Advisory Committee believed the requirement of 
“bad faith” adopted in numerous circuits to be “too restrictive.”254  The 
Committee also rejected the Second Circuit’s position that “negligence” or 
                                                 
 248. Discovery Subcommittee, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Report of the Discovery 
Subcommittee on Action Item: Recommend Adoption of Rule 37(e), at 369 (April 10, 2014). 
 249. As revised, Rule 37(e) reads, “[i]f electronically stored information that should have been 
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable 
steps to preserve it . . . the court [may]: (1) upon finding prejudice to another party from the loss of 
the information, []order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or (2) only upon 
finding that the party acted with the intent” use other forms of sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.  A 
committee note on the proposed amendments to Rule 37(e) highlights this point further, noting, 
“[e]xcept in very rare cases in which a party’s actions cause the loss of information that irreparably 
deprives another party of any meaningful opportunity to present or defend against the claims in the 
litigation, sanctions for loss of discoverable information may only be imposed on a finding of 
willfulness or bad faith, combined with substantial prejudice.” Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
Published Rule 37(e) Amendment Proposal, at 395 (April 10-11, 2015). 
 250. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 251. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 245, at 40. 
 252. Id. at 41; see also GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. CV-12-1318-LPS, 2016 WL 
3792833, at *1–2 (D. Del. July 12, 2016). 
 253. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2). 
 254. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 245, at 38. 
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“gross negligence” was enough for severe sanctions.255  Between the two 
standards, the Advisory Committee’s notes leave some ambiguity as to what will 
count as enough.  For example, despite numerous comments questioning 
whether recklessness would be sufficient under the rule, the Committee 
remained silent.256 
Where “intent to deprive” is found, the court may: 1) “presume that the lost 
information was unfavorable to the party;” 2) “instruct the jury that it may or 
must presume the information was unfavorable to the party;” or 3) “dismiss the 
action or enter default judgment.”257  While negligence may not be a sufficient 
standard for these more severe sanctions, it may still warrant proportional 
sanctions.  Rule 37(e) also provides for sanctions upon a finding of “prejudice 
to another party from loss of the information.”258  Then, a court may “order 
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”259  While the more 
severe sanctions reserved for “intent to deprive” are not included as possible 
measures, the extent of the court’s authority is unclear. 
Other than attempting to create uniformity, the Subcommittee shied away 
from making any further changes to ESI discovery rules.  The Subcommittee 
recognized that tinkering with sanctions is unlikely to drastically alter the ESI 
preservation landscape, explaining: 
The Subcommittee felt that reducing the risk of sanctions would 
correspondingly reduce the incentives for over-preservation. The 
Subcommittee continues to believe that this is a worthwhile goal, but 
has realized that the savings to be achieved from reducing over-
preservation are quite uncertain. Many who commented noted their 
high costs of preservation, but none was able to provide any precise 
prediction of the amount that would be saved by reducing the fear of 
sanctions. . . So the potential savings from reducing over-preservation, 
although still worth pursuing, are too uncertain to justify seriously 
limiting trial court discretion.260 
A fundamental reason for the inability of the new rule to address the rising 
costs of ESI preservation and discovery is the Subcommittee’s unwillingness to 
directly address the scope of the duty of preservation.  The Subcommittee made 
clear that it would leave it to the courts to develop the tests that determine 
whether ESI should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation.261  Although the Subcommittee was correct to conclude that 
                                                 
 255. Id. at 39; see also Living Color Enter., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-CV-
62216, 2016 WL 1105297, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016). 
 256. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 245, at 44. 
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(A)–(C). 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Discovery Subcommittee, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Report of the Discovery 
Subcommittee on Action Item: Recommend Adoption of Rule 37(e), at 372 (Apr. 10, 2014). 
 261. Id. at 372. 
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determining what should be preserved is a highly case-specific inquiry, it 
overlooked an opportunity to curb the source of rapidly inflating discovery costs 
by adopting what it views as the “well developed and fairly consistent” case law 
on the scope of discovery.262  As a consequence, the revised rule is unlikely to 
have a substantial effect on the major problems plaguing e-discovery, even if it 
changes the language that courts use when imposing sanctions. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Under modern standards, the loss of the job cards in the machine shop likely 
would have resulted in a different outcome.263  The machine shop would be 
saddled with the burden of storing and maintaining these cards even after they 
had outlived their business purpose because failing to do so might render them 
unable to recover any non-payments.  While this burden may not seem 
particularly onerous, imagine that the pile of job cards is growing exponentially 
each year and the machine shop must dedicate significant resources to 
purchasing storing space and maintaining these business cards regardless of 
whether they might ever be useful in litigation.  This is where the modern 
construction of a company’s obligation to preserve ESI has led.  And while the 
revised Rule 37(e) was designed to help address this problem of over-
preservation, it does so by restricting when and how harm may be visited on a 
company that loses some job cards.  It leaves untouched the questions of when 
the duty to preserve arises and what material it covers. 
A return to the traditional common-law standards would mean that parties 
generally have no duties to preserve documents until the actual filing of a 
lawsuit—or, at most, when litigation is imminent.  Once litigation has officially 
commenced, parties would then have a better idea of which custodians are truly 
likely to have access to relevant documents and records.  By instituting 
preservation obligations at this stage, litigants can ensure a fair discovery 
process without spending exorbitant sums on maintaining and reviewing 
documents that will never be relevant to an actual lawsuit. 
Many commentators believe the modern construction of preservation 
obligations is the result of failing to keep up with the digital age.264  But the 
opposite may be true.  While articulated before the onslaught of ESI, the 
common-law approach to preservation offers more clarity on when a duty to 
preserve arises and what materials must be protected.265  As such, a return to 
these common-law standards would offer significant relief to the burdens of 
over-preserving ESI.  Moreover, there is little reason to retain the modern 
                                                 
 262. Id. 
 263. Crosby v. Little River Sand & Gravel Dev., 31 So. 2d 226, 228 (La. 1947). 
 264. Daniel B. Garrie & Daniel K. Gelb, E Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Need For Specific 
Rules, 43 SUFFOLK L. REV. 393, 412 (2010). 
 265. Wright, supra note 16, at 794. 
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standards.  They rely on dubious interpretations to reach a conclusion that 
significantly diverges from prior precedent, and even those tasked with 
improving them recognize their limited efficacy to keep up with the digital age.  
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